THE FALLACY OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION: Reasserting The Territorial Limits Of Section 66 Of The 1999 Constitution

By H.C. OBUMNEMENWA, ESQ. (LEGAL PRACTITIONER)

 He is under a sentence of death imposed on him by any competent court of law or tribunal in Nigeria or a sentence of imprisonment or fine for an offence involving dishonesty or fraud (by whatever name called) or any other sentence imposed on him by such a court or tribunal or substituted by a competent authority for any other sentence imposed on him by such a court;

 Within a period of less than ten years before the date of an election to a legislative house, he has been convicted and sentenced for an offence involving dishonesty or he has been found guilty of a contravention of the Code of Conduct. 

Above are the express and verbatim reproduction of section 66(1)(c) and (d), the very essence is for us to have a meticulous and clearer look at it.

If we truly understand the above provision we will undoubtedly align with the position that subsection 1(d) is a consequential provision flowing from subsection 1(c), that is after a person must have been tried, found guilty and convicted in any competent court of law or tribunal in Nigeria, not any court in America, or any Court in Europe or Canada or any other country of the world but rather emphasis is on Nigeria only.

A faithful reading of Section 66(1)(c) reveals that the Constitution deliberately confines the source of legal disability to “a court of law or tribunal in Nigeria,” and proceeds to use the expression “such a court or tribunal.” The use of the word “such” is not accidental; it is referential and restrictive, pointing back to the category already identified, namely, courts and tribunals within Nigeria. It does not admit of an expansive interpretation that includes foreign jurisdictions. 

To construe it otherwise is to do violence to the plain language of the Constitution and to import into it words that are simply not there.

The constitution is intentional, it is not by omission that it did not mention any other country, it expressly, emphatically and strictly mentioned Nigeria over and over under section 66 of the Constitution, that is to say, it does not place its reliance on adjudications that did not happen in Nigeria which the courts in Nigeria were not availed or offered the judicial notice, it primarily concerns itself with adjudications from the courts in Nigeria.

In law generally, the rule of holistic or harmonious interpretation, is that the constitution must be read as a whole, and not in isolated fragments. 

The error in the recent social media ballyhoo on section 66 of the 1999 constitution lies in the selective reading of the Constitution. 

It is trite that no provision can be interpreted in isolation; the Constitution must be read as an integrated whole.

Any contrary approach amounts to a distortion of its meaning.

In Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1981), the court held that the Constitution must be read as a whole and its provisions construed together. See also Nafiu Rabiu v. State (1980).

In law, we don’t just read things and give them beer parlour interpretations and crude misapprehension.

There are universal standard practices which are accepted, we follow doctrines, principles, rules and cannons. 

Very instructive in this extant case are canons of interpretation known as 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius' and 'Ejusdem Generis'.

Dovetailing from the above, let’s proportionately expound and offer in-depth analysis on these relevant cannons of interpretation of legal constructions, that is, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (meaning, that, the express mention of a thing is the exclusion of another) in relation to Section 66 of the 1999 Constitution.

This cannon is saying that where the Constitution has expressly identified the category of courts whose decisions may give rise to legal disabilities, it necessarily excludes all others not mentioned.

This principle has received judicial affirmation in cases such as Udoh v. Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board (1993), Bronik Motors Ltd v. Wema Bank Ltd (1983), in the mentioned cases, it was established that courts must not import into a statute what the legislature has deliberately excluded. 

This denotes in the extant case, that, if the Constitution intended to include foreign courts, it would have expressly mentioned it.

Let us also analyze the cannon of Ejusdem Generis. This cannon limits general words to the same class previously mentioned. 

The attempt to extend the scope of Section 66 beyond its clear textual limits is contrary to the settled rule of interpretation encapsulated in the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Where specific words are followed by general expressions, the latter must be confined to the class of the former. 

This principle has been consistently applied by the courts. In ACB Ltd v. Apugo (1995), the Supreme Court held that general words cannot be given an unrestricted meaning divorced from the specific context in which they appear.

This same Section 66 of the 1999 Constitution also brings the issue of jurisdiction to the front burner. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, is by its very nature, a territorial instrument, operating within and deriving its authority from the sovereign boundaries of Nigeria. Its provisions must therefore be understood within the context of Nigeria’s territorial jurisdiction.

Where the Constitution expressly refers to a “court of law or tribunal in Nigeria” and subsequently employs the phrase “such a court,” it reinforces a deliberate territorial limitation. 

The law is settled that jurisdiction is fundamentally territorial and courts do not ordinarily exercise authority beyond the geographical confines of the state, except where expressly provided. See, Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962), where the Supreme Court underscored jurisdiction as the lifeblood of adjudication. 

In the absence of any express constitutional provision extending any liability to foreign tribunals or courts, it would be a clear infraction of established principles of interpretation to import such extraterritorial consequences into Section 66 of the 1999 constitution.To do so would not only stretch the language of the Constitution beyond its permissible limits but would also subject Nigeria’s constitutional order to external legal determinations in a manner never contemplated by its framers.

The Constitution speaks within Nigeria, for Nigeria and through Nigerian institutions. It does not outsource powers to foreign jurisdictions.

The whole controversy dissolves upon a faithful reading of the Constitution. Subsection 1(c) is clear in its words, deliberate in its structure and limited in its reach. By expressly referring to a “court of law or tribunal in Nigeria” and thereafter to “such a court,” the Constitution anchors the source of any legal and legitimate disability within the territorial jurisdiction of Nigeria. 

To extend that provision to foreign tribunals or courts is to substitute conjecture for construction and to read into the Constitution words it has not used. 

The settled canons of interpretation, 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' and 'ejusdem generis' forbid such enlargement.

Any continued reliance on a non-existent foundation to harass or malign any person is an attempt to incur legal responsibilities against oneself.  

Accordingly, any opposing opinion fails on all fronts, in letters, spirit, principle and purpose. 

It offends the territorial logic of the Constitution, disregards its express limits and undermines the certainty that the rule of law demands. 

The Constitution governs within Nigeria, through Nigerian institutions and according to its own terms. 

Those terms are neither elastic nor optional.

They are final.