By H. C. OBUMNEMENWA (Legal Practitioner)
Ex nihilo nihil fit, nothing comes from nothing, it is a settled principle of law. In Macfoy v. United Africa Company Ltd. (1962), Lord Denning stated thus “You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there, it will collapse". Nigerian courts had also reiterated this principle, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962), Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002).
Let us proceed on a simple but inviolable premise, that the Constitution means exactly what it says, law is what it is. Let us also be distinctly clear, concise and precise. By every sense of the cannons of interpretation of legal constructions, vis-a-vis, literal, mischief, ejusdem generis and Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,et'al. Section 66 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 is strictly constricted on adjudications conducted by the courts within the Nigerian jurisdiction and does not concern itself with the meddlesome interloping on matters not brought to the judicial notices of Nigerian courts at the very valid material period.We shall expatiate and expound this in the next communication, for now let us offer an in-depth analysis of the said section 66 of the 1999 Constitution,that is,a situation where an incident occurred in Nigeria and was adjudicated by Nigerian courts, that is, within the Nigerian Jurisdiction.
Objective,fair, unbiased and reasonable sound minds will concur that the noise being reinvented in certain quarters over the eligibility of a Nigerian citizen who, having once suffered a conviction and had long outlived the constitutional period of disqualification from serving as either a member of the Senate or Federal House of Representatives raises a fundamental question that goes beyond partisan contestation and strikes at the very heart of constitutional supremacy.
Whether upon a proper construction and interpretation of Section 66(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, a prior conviction, particularly one occurring outside the jurisdiction of Nigerian courts can validly sustain a continuing legal disability from contesting for membership of the National Assembly after the expiration of the constitutionally prescribed period, and if not, whether the persistent reliance on such a spent conviction for so much hullaballoo in the public space and social media razzmatazz do not amount to a conspicuously malicious misinterpretation of the Constitution and an affront to its supremacy, undermining Nigeria’s legal sovereignty and a premeditated attempt to countermand the rule of law with intent to deliberately mislead and weaponize the unsuspecting general public to persecute, victimize and vilify one who is no more with liabilities by those who are privileged to know better?
Section 66(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,1999 is neither ambiguous nor elastic in its intendment, the natural meanings of words used by the legislature are concise, precise, exact and unambiguous, it is very obvious that the Constitution expressly provides for ‘Constitutional Forgiveness’ for any Nigerian citizen who has suffered conviction and thereafter shown cause to be accepted as having good legal and even moral standing. It prescribes a specific, time-bound disqualification of 10 years, the legal effect of which is extinguished upon the effluxion of the stipulated 10 years time.To contend otherwise is to invite a dangerous departure from settled principles of constitutional interpretation and to subject the clear words of the grundnorm to the vagaries of political convenience.
It is a cardinal principle of Nigerian constitutional jurisprudence that provisions which derogate from civil and political rights must be construed strictly and within their express terms.
In Adesanya v. President of Nigeria, the Supreme Court emphasized unwavering fidelity to the text of the Constitution, warning against interpretative approaches that expand its provisions beyond their clear meaning. This position was reinforced in Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abubakar, where the Court cautioned that constitutional limitations must not be stretched by implication or political expediency. More pointedly, in FRN v. Osahon, the apex Court reaffirmed that provisions carrying adverse or penal consequences must be interpreted narrowly in favour of the person affected.
Against this settled background, Section 66(1)(d) admits of no creative enlargement. Once the Constitution itself has drawn the boundary of disqualification and allowed it to lapse by the passage of time, neither public sentiment, media agitation, nor political hostility can resurrect a disability that has ceased to exist in law. Any attempt to do so is not merely a misconstruing of the provision, it is an affront to the supremacy of the Constitution, a subtle erosion of the rule of law and a dangerous attempt to undermine Nigeria’s legal sovereignty
To further understand Section 66(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, it is instructive to understand the Doctrine of Estoppel.The continued attempt to resurrect a matter well laid to rest by the Constitution runs at variance with the settled doctrine of estoppel and legal finality under the law of evidence. It is a fundamental principle that there must be an end to litigation and, indeed, to all matters capable of legal determination.
The law does not permit a party to approbate and reprobate, nor to persist in asserting a position which the law itself has extinguished.
Dovetailing from the above, the position of the Evidence Act, 2011 on estoppel in criminal matters, through the doctrine of res judicata which operates in form of autre fois acquit or autre fois convict covers the same ground as Cause of Action Estoppel in civil matters, the rationale behind this doctrine is that, it is for the common good of all,that, there must be an end to every matter, also that no one should be tried more than once on the same ground, see Omokhafe v. Esekhane(1995).
This expressly precludes and prohibits the constant and continued re-examinations of the same matter, be it in the court of competent jurisdiction or by extension in the court of public opinion. This is because such legal disability has ceased to exist by operation of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has, in a long line of authorities, underscored the necessity for finality in legal affairs. In Ajide v. Kelani, the Court emphasized that a party cannot be allowed to resile from a position once it has become legally settled. Similarly, in Ude v. Nwara, it was held that the doctrine of estoppel serves as a shield against the reopening of concluded issues.
So, we must allow settled issues to be perpetually vacated from public conversations.
Again, by estoppel, once the Constitution has, by effluxion of time, brought an issue to an end, the matter is spent both constitutionally and evidentially. Opponents who persist in invoking such a lapsed disability are, in effect, seeking to reopen a concluded legal state of affairs,an approach the law firmly forbids.
The general public whoever they may be are estopped, that is restricted and totally barred from reasserting the matter either in the court of law or court of public opinion because the Constitution has declared its cessation.To hold otherwise would be to undermine not only the supremacy of the Constitution but also the integrity of the legal system, which rests upon certainty, consistency, and finality.
Also worthy of note is the fact that a ‘constitutional forgiveness’ which has been duly conferred by constitutional design cannot be reversed by rhetorical insistence and such contentions being advanced by the opportunists amounts, at best, to a beer parlour understanding of the Constitution, one that collapses upon even the smallest elementary scrutiny.
Therefore, it is deeply troubling that fly-by-night and self-styled custodians of morality, who seek to constitute themselves into a law unto their own whims and acting without regard to constitutional limits, persist in assailing a position that the Constitution has definitively resolved for cynical political exploitation.
Ipso facto, any person or any group calling for disqualification, rejection of political ambition, malicious public scrutiny, re-examination, vilification, victimization and stigmatization of a person whom the constitution has already relieved of liabilities will be doing so at their own peril, as such persons may be sued in a viable claim in defamation.
It is settled that a defamatory statement is one which lowers a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, as affirmed in Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd v. Ajagbemokeferi (1989), while the deliberate or reckless portrayal of a spent conviction as a subsisting legal disability amounts to a false and misleading representation of the claimant's legal status, therefore falls within the ambit of actionable defamation. See also Guardian Newspapers Ltd v. Ajeh (2011).
Indeed, the law is settled that even a statement rooted in fact may become actionable where it is presented in a misleading manner,see Onagoruwa v. IGP (1991).
Also, such persons or groups, may also be sued for cyber harassment under section 24 of the (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act, 2015, for such conducts in the digital sphere.
By virtue of section 1(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Constitution is supreme, it is the alpha and omega,the beginning and the end of all laws. It has spoken and its words admit no distortion.Section 66(1)(d) imposes a time-bound legal disability and confers moral forgiveness, not a lifelong stigma.
Once the period of disability is extinguished any attempt to revive it is legally and morally baseless.
A dead disqualification and or liability cannot be resurrected by noise or repetition.
In a constitutional democracy, the matter is closed.
The Constitution does not punish forever. What has died in law and laid to rest forever cannot be revived by sentiment.
The matter is settled.
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